# TORAZ Backend — Recovery Gaps

**Batch:** Recovery 0 (inventory only)
**Date:** 2026-10-07
**Status:** Awaiting review.

This is the list of everything the surviving record does not settle. It is deliberately exhaustive: a gap listed here is a gap that will not be silently filled later.

Read [`RECOVERY_BASELINE.md`](./RECOVERY_BASELINE.md) first for the source abbreviations (MP, R01–R07, FE) and the precedence order.

---

## 1. Summary

| Section | What it covers | Count |
|---|---|---|
| A | Artifacts that existed and are gone | 7 |
| B | Decisions the recovery package says to preserve but does not state | 14 |
| C | Conflicts between surviving sources | 10 |
| D | Contract details no surviving source settles | 23 |
| E | Environment | 4 |
| | **Total** | **58** |

### Classes

| Class | Meaning | Count |
|---|---|---|
| **ASK** | A product rule, or an action only you can take. It will not be guessed. Each one comes with a fallback you can approve in a word. | 15 |
| **DEFAULT** | A technical or contract detail. The stated assumption will be built and listed in that batch's report, unless you say otherwise. | 33 |
| **SETTLED** | Resolved by the precedence order. Recorded for traceability. | 2 |
| **INFO** | A loss or limitation with no decision attached. | 8 |

### The fifteen ASK items in one place

| ID | Question | Needed by |
|---|---|---|
| E1 | Can `registry.npmjs.org` be allowed in this environment's network egress settings? | Recovery 1 |
| E2 | Can `fastdl.mongodb.org` be allowed too, or will database-backed tests run elsewhere? | Recovery 2 |
| E4 | Where should the work be kept so a workspace reset cannot lose it again? | Recovery 1 |
| C10 | Should `docs/IMPLEMENTATION_DECISIONS.md` be created now as a copy of R02? | Recovery 1 |
| D13 | How was the first admin account created? | Recovery 2 |
| B7 | What was the discovery compatibility rule? | Recovery 4 |
| B6 | What was the "unknown distance" value, and what does the distance filter do when distance is unknown? | Recovery 4 |
| B2 | What happens on "pass" and on revoking a like? | Recovery 4 |
| B3 | How many Super Likes does a new account get, and when? | Recovery 4 |
| B4 | What was the report rate limit? | Recovery 6 |
| D9 | What happens to an existing match and conversation when one person blocks the other? | Recovery 6 |
| C8 | When a profile privacy toggle and a settings privacy toggle disagree, which wins? | Recovery 9 |
| B8 | At purge, what happens to records other than photos, the verification document and messages? | Recovery 9 |
| D16 | Between a deletion request and the purge: can the user sign in, and can they cancel? | Recovery 9 |
| D15 | What did "request data export" do? | Recovery 9 |

None of these blocks Recovery 1 from being written. E1 decides whether Recovery 1 can be *run*.

### What would close the most gaps for the least effort

These are artifacts, not phase prompts. If any of them still exists anywhere (a download folder, an email, an import inside the Postman app, an export of the earlier conversation), one file can close a dozen entries below.

1. **The old Postman collection JSON.** It holds every path, method, body shape, variable and all 17 negative cases. Closes B1 and B9 outright and most of C5, D1–D3, D18. If it was ever imported into Postman, it can be re-exported from there.
2. **The old `ROUTE_INVENTORY.md` or `API.md`,** or the text of the "mechanical route-file cross-check" that corrected 57 to 56. Closes B1.
3. **The old `DATABASE_DESIGN.md` or `FRONTEND_BACKEND_FIELD_MAPPING.md`.** Closes most of section D.
4. **The old `.env.example`.** Closes B13 and D7.
5. **Any ZIP, backup or pasted code from the earlier work,** however partial.

For the product-rule gaps, the answer is more likely to be in the *report or review exchange* for the relevant phase than in the phase prompt itself, since the prompts set tasks and the decisions were made afterwards. If you supply history in controlled batches, this is where each gap would be found:

| Original phase | Gaps it would answer |
|---|---|
| 2 Authentication | C3, C5, C6, D7, D13, D20 |
| 3 Profile | D4, D5, C9 |
| 4 Photos | C2, D6 |
| 5 Discovery | B6, B7, D19 |
| 6 Matching | B2, B3 |
| 7 Messaging | B5, B12, D3, D8, D10, D11 |
| 8 Safety | B4, D9, D18 |
| 9 Verification | B10, C1, D21 |
| 10 Premium | B13, D22 |
| 11 Settings and admin | B8, B11, B14, C7, C8, D12, D14–D17 |

---

## A. Artifacts that existed and are gone

All seven are class INFO.

| ID | Lost | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| A1 | All backend source code | Every file from Recovery 1 onward is new. None may be called "recovered". |
| A2 | Backend design and reference documents: field mapping, API contract, database design, `API.md`, route inventory, security audit, deployment guide, README | Field-level model design, indexes, request and response shapes, and prior audit findings must be re-derived and re-reviewed. |
| A3 | The Postman collection (73 requests) | Rebuilt from the reconstructed routes in Recovery 10. |
| A4 | All tests | Rewritten. Historical pass/fail results are not evidence about the new code. |
| A5 | Backend `package.json`, lockfile and `.env.example` | Dependencies, versions and variables added after MP §30 are unknown. |
| A6 | Phase history and API verification record in original form | R01 lists them as surviving; only the summaries in R01 and R02 are present. |
| A7 | The frontend's own "Master" and "Decisions" documents and the design reference | Cited in frontend comments; the reasoning behind some frontend choices cannot be checked. |

---

## B. Decisions the package says to preserve but does not state

These are the genuinely unrecoverable items. In each case the package refers to a decision that was made, without saying what it was.

### B1 — The route list
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** every batch, finally Recovery 10
- **Record says:** 56 routes, after a mechanical cross-check corrected 57 (R01 §5, R07). Never hard-code the number.
- **Missing:** which 56. Only 29 have a method and path in the master prompt; 32 more capabilities are evidenced without a path (`RECOVERY_BASELINE.md` §8).
- **Handling:** explicit paths are used as written. Each remaining path is proposed in `API_CONTRACT.md` at the start of its batch and marked [RECONSTRUCT]. The final count is generated from the route files and compared with 56; any difference is reported, not forced.

### B2 — Pass, and revoking an outbound like
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 4
- **Record says:** "Preserve the previously approved behavior for deleting/revoking outbound likes rather than inventing a new product rule" (R01 §5). The frontend has `pass(memberId)` returning `{ relationship }`; its mock sets the relationship to `none`.
- **Missing:** the behaviour itself. Is a pass stored, so the person is not shown again? Is "pass" the same operation as revoking a like? Can a like be revoked after it produced a match, and does the match end? Is a revoked Super Like refunded?
- **Fallback:** `pass` removes the caller's own outbound like to that person if one exists and no match exists, and returns `none`. Nothing else is stored, a match is never dissolved, and nothing is refunded.

### B3 — Super Like initial grant
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 4
- **Record says:** "Preserve the previously established initial grant/ledger behavior" (R01 §5). The frontend mock starts a free account at `superLikesRemaining: 3`.
- **Missing:** the amount, the trigger (account creation, registration completion, first read) and the ledger reason codes.
- **Fallback:** a single grant of 3, written to the ledger once when registration completes. The plan features in the frontend mention weekly free Super Likes; no recurring grant is built (see D22).

### B4 — Report rate limit
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 6
- **Record says:** "Preserve the previously established report rate limit" (R01 §5).
- **Missing:** the number and the window.
- **Fallback:** the limit becomes a configuration value. A clearly marked provisional default is used and named in the batch report until you confirm the figure.

### B5 — Message pagination semantics and ordering
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 5
- **Record says:** "Preserve cursor pagination semantics and response ordering already established" (R01 §5). The frontend has no pagination: `getMessages(conversationId)` returns an array, rendered in order and scrolled to the bottom.
- **Missing:** cursor type, parameter names, page size, sort direction, and the shape of the pagination block (MP §29 shows page/limit/total, which does not fit a cursor).
- **Handling:** opaque cursor based on message ID; `before` and `limit` query parameters; newest page first; messages inside a page ordered oldest to newest, which is what the UI renders; `pagination: { nextCursor, hasMore, limit }`.

### B6 — The "unknown distance" value
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 4
- **Record says:** distance used "a safe unknown sentinel rather than pretending an actual distance exists" (R01 §5). `MemberCard.distanceKm` is a required number. The frontend collects no coordinates.
- **Missing:** the sentinel (`null`, `-1`, something else), and what the `distanceKm` filter does when no distance can be computed.
- **Fallback:** `distanceKm: null`. A `distanceKm` filter excludes nobody whose distance is unknown. No geospatial index is created, because no coordinates exist to index.

### B7 — Discovery compatibility rule
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 4
- **Record says:** "Enforce compatibility based on actual stored fields" (R01 §5); gender and orientation compatibility "only according to the actual frontend data and approved business rules" (MP §12). Stored fields: `gender` (5 values), `interestedIn` (`women`, `men`, `everyone`), optional `sexualOrientation`.
- **Missing:** the rule. Is it checked in both directions? Which `interestedIn` values admit `non_binary`, `self_describe` and `prefer_not_to_say`? Does `sexualOrientation` or `datingIntention` take part?
- **Fallback:** checked in both directions. `everyone` admits every gender; `women` admits `woman`; `men` admits `man`. The other three gender values are admitted only by `everyone`. Orientation and intention are not used. This fallback materially limits who non-binary members are shown to, so it should be a conscious choice.

### B8 — Purge scope beyond the three named actions
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- **Record says:** at purge, hard-delete photos from database and disk, delete the verification document, tombstone messages in place, and "preserve other records where the frontend/product contract did not require their deletion" (R01 §5). The frontend promises that "verification hashes, chats, and photos will be permanently purged within 30 days".
- **Missing:** the fate of the profile's personal fields (name, date of birth, bio, religion and so on), the phone number on the account (can it register again?), sessions, likes, matches, blocks, settings and the Super Like ledger. MP §24 forbids inventing a retention policy silently.
- **Fallback:** exactly the three named actions, plus revoking all sessions and marking the account deleted. Everything else is retained and listed in the security audit as a decision required before production.

### B9 — The 17 negative and security Postman requests
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 10
- **Record says:** 17 requests; R06 lists the categories (unauthenticated access, non-admin on admin routes, ownership, invalid IDs, invalid payloads, duplicate likes, blocked interaction, invalid verification state, disabled verification, disabled payment, rate limiting, bad uploads, unauthorized conversation access, socket room note).
- **Missing:** the 17 specific requests.
- **Handling:** rebuilt from the categories against the actual routes. The resulting number is reported and may not be 17.

### B10 — The 9 verification gate tests
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 7
- **Record says:** "9 pure verification-provider gate tests" (R01 Recovery 7).
- **Missing:** the nine cases.
- **Handling:** derived from the gate's inputs (provider enabled, provider configured, simulation flag, production or not) and the three required outcomes. The number of cases is reported and may not be nine.

### B11 — How an unsupported KPI is represented
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- **Record says:** return "a clearly documented unsupported/unknown representation rather than inventing data" for `gateway_retries`, `boost_triggers`, `mod_queue_sla` (R01 §5). `AdminKpi` is `{ id, label, value: string, hint? }`.
- **Missing:** the representation.
- **Handling:** the same four fields with `value: null`, plus `supported: false` and a hint of "Not tracked". Supported KPIs carry `supported: true`.

### B12 — Whose entitlement sets `isPro` on a conversation
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 5
- **Record says:** "Messaging premium state must be derived from the correct participant's entitlement" (R01 §5), without naming the participant.
- **Evidence:** in the Messages screen, `isPro` true shows "calling is coming in a future update" and false sends the viewer to `/premium`. It gates what the viewer can do.
- **Handling:** `isPro` is the viewing user's own calling entitlement.

### B13 — Payment-disabled response, and the simulation flags
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 7 and 8
- **Record says:** disabled payment grants nothing; simulation must be explicitly enabled and impossible in production (R01 §5). Verification returns 503 when unavailable.
- **Missing:** the status code and body for a purchase while payment is disabled; the names of the verification and payment simulation variables.
- **Handling:** 503 with the standard error envelope, matching verification. New variables `VERIFICATION_DEV_SIMULATION` and `PAYMENT_DEV_SIMULATION`, both `false` by default and refused when `NODE_ENV=production`. The names are new.

### B14 — Which admin actions were audited
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- **Record says:** audit records "where previously required" (R01 §5); "important admin mutations" (MP §25); actions affecting reports (MP §21).
- **Handling:** every admin write is audited: status change, verification decision, report update. Reads are not.

---

## C. Conflicts between surviving sources

### C1 — Three verification vocabularies
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 7
- **Conflict:** MP §22 has five upper-case states. The frontend's member-facing `VerificationState` has ten lower-case states. The frontend's admin `AdminVerificationStatus` has five different ones (`verified`, `pending`, `retry_required`, `manual_review`, `unverified`).
- **Handling:** store the ten frontend states, since the frontend is the contract. `percentComplete` uses the frontend mock's table. The admin status is derived: `verified` and `manual_review` map to themselves; `retry_required` and `failed` to `retry_required`; `not_started` and `mobile_verified` to `unverified`; the rest to `pending`. Admin approve sets `verified`; admin reject sets `retry_required`, as in the frontend admin mock.

### C2 — Maximum photo size: 5 MB or 10 MB
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 3
- **Conflict:** MP §30 shows `MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB=5`. The frontend uploader accepts up to 10 MB.
- **Handling:** configurable, default 10, so the backend does not reject files the UI accepts. Maximum 5 photos per profile, from the frontend.

### C3 — Account status values
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- **Conflict:** MP §5 suggests `ACTIVE`, `SUSPENDED`, `BLOCKED`, `DELETED` ("such as"). The frontend admin type has `active` and `suspended` only.
- **Handling:** store `active`, `suspended`, `deleted` in lower case. `BLOCKED` is not created because nothing uses it. A pending deletion is tracked on `AccountDeletionRequest`, not as a fourth status.

### C4 — `mobile` or `countryCode` + `phoneNumber`
**Class:** SETTLED
- MP §5 says `User.mobile`. The frontend sends `countryCode` and `phoneNumber`. The frontend names win (MP §0 rule 2). Uniqueness is enforced on the pair.

### C5 — Verify-OTP result shape and the response envelope
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- **Conflict:** the frontend expects `{ success: true, isNewUser }` or `{ success: false, reason }` with reason `invalid_code`, `expired` or `too_many_attempts`. The API envelope also uses `success`. R06 adds that the response carries the access token and user ID.
- **Missing:** where `reason` lived and which status codes were used.
- **Handling:** success is 200 with `data: { isNewUser, accessToken, user }` and the refresh cookie. Failure is an error envelope with `errors.reason`: 400 for `invalid_code`, 410 for `expired`, 429 for `too_many_attempts`. `isNewUser` means registration has not been completed.

### C6 — What `expiresInSeconds` means
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- **Conflict:** the frontend type calls it "seconds until the code expires" but the UI uses it for the resend countdown, and the mock returns 30, not 300. R02 warns not to confuse the two.
- **Handling:** `expiresInSeconds` returns the 30-second resend cooldown, which is what the UI consumes. The 5-minute validity is enforced on the server.

### C7 — Admin `maskedEmail` with no email anywhere
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- **Conflict:** `AdminUserRecord.maskedEmail` is shown in the admin detail dialog, but no screen, schema or model collects an email address.
- **Handling:** `maskedEmail: null`. No email field is invented.

### C8 — Overlapping privacy toggles
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 9 (affects serializers from Recovery 3)
- **Record says:** "Privacy settings and profile privacy are distinct concepts" (R01 §5).
- **Conflict:** three pairs control the same thing. Profile `showOnlineStatus` and settings `onlineActivityIndicator`; profile `showExactAge` and settings `displayExactAge`; profile `showApproxDistance` and settings `approximateProximity`.
- **Missing:** which one governs what other members see when the two differ; and what is returned when a value is hidden (for example `age`, a required number, when exact age is off).
- **Fallback:** stored separately as the record requires. The more restrictive of each pair applies. A hidden value is returned as `null`; hidden online status is returned as `isOnline: false`.

### C9 — Photos and phone fields inside the profile payload
**Class:** SETTLED
- The frontend sends `photos[]`, `phoneVerified`, `countryCode` and `phoneNumber` with every register and update call. R01 §5 forbids arbitrary photo URL writes, and identity comes from the token (R01 §4). On write these four are ignored. On read they are filled from the Photo records and the account.

### C10 — Recovery 0 deliverables: three documents or four
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 1
- **Conflict:** R03 lists four, including `docs/IMPLEMENTATION_DECISIONS.md`. R05 and your instruction list three.
- **Handling so far:** three were created, as you asked. The fourth would be a verbatim copy of R02.
- **Fallback:** it is created at the start of Recovery 1.

---

## D. Contract details no surviving source settles

### D1 — Which identifier addresses a member
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 3
- `MemberCard.id`, route `:userId` and `Conversation.memberId` need one meaning. **Handling:** the account ID everywhere a member is addressed. `profileId` appears only in the register response, which the frontend expects.

### D2 — Timestamps or display labels
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 4 and 5
- Frontend mocks put display text ("Just now", "4:15 PM", "Since Sep 2024") in `sentAt`, `lastMessageAt` and every `*Label` field, and ISO strings in `updatedAt`, `savedAt` and `boostExpiresAt`. All are typed `string`.
- **Handling:** ISO 8601 for every field not named `*Label`. Fields named `*Label` are formatted on the server.

### D3 — `senderId: "me"`
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 5
- The frontend type is `"me" | string` and the bubble checks `senderId === "me"`.
- **Handling:** REST responses return `"me"` for the caller's own messages and the account ID for the other person's. Socket events are serialized per recipient the same way.

### D4 — Draft storage and the "registered" marker
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 3
- The frontend has `saveDraft` (partial values) but no method to load a draft. R04 lists no Draft model. `Profile.status` was rejected (R01 §5).
- **Handling:** one Profile per account, created at the first draft save or at registration. A `registeredAt` timestamp marks a completed registration; discovery requires it. Draft saves validate only the fields present. A second registration returns 409, matching the frontend's `duplicate_submission`.

### D5 — Enforcing option lists on string-typed fields
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 3
- Only `gender`, `datingIntention` and `interestedIn` are enums in the Zod schema. Nineteen other fields are plain strings or string arrays in the schema but fixed choices in the UI: 13 single-choice (`sexualOrientation`, `pronouns`, `relationshipStatus`, `haveChildren`, `wantChildren`, `openToPartnerWithKids`, `bodyType`, `activityLevel`, `starSign`, `drinking`, `smoking`, `educationLevel`, `promptQuestion`) and 6 multi-choice (`interests`, `languages`, `diet`, `pets`, `vibeTags`, `otherPreferences`).
- **Handling:** those nineteen are validated against the lists in FE:`config/registration-options.ts`. Free-text fields stay free text with the schema's length limits. This is stricter than the frontend schema, so a value the UI cannot produce is rejected.

### D6 — Photo processing and serving details
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 3
- **Missing:** output format after re-encoding; minimum and maximum dimensions (MP §30 leaves them blank); who may fetch a photo; the URL placed in `ProfilePhoto.url`.
- **Handling:** re-encode to JPEG with metadata stripped and orientation applied. Dimension limits are configuration values with provisional defaults named in the batch report. Photos are served by an authenticated route that applies the same block and visibility policy as profile viewing; the uploads directory is never served statically. One point is left open on purpose: a browser `<img>` tag cannot send a bearer token, which matters only when the frontend is integrated and is out of scope here.

### D7 — OTP limits beyond the two confirmed numbers
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- **Confirmed:** 30 s cooldown, 5 min validity. **From the frontend mock only:** 5 verify attempts, 5 resends. **Missing:** hourly and daily caps per number and per IP; how a developer obtains the code when SMS is disabled.
- **Handling:** 5 attempts and 5 resends. Other caps are configuration values with provisional defaults. A fixed development code is available only when explicitly configured and never in production (MP §8). The code is never logged.

### D8 — What happens to a flagged message
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 5
- The UI shows the sender their own message as "Under review" and says it is held "before it's delivered". There is no screen or route to release it, no recipient decision UI, and MP §19 says not to invent one.
- **Handling:** with moderation disabled (the default), every message is `clear`. With it enabled, a flagged message is stored as `pending_review`, shown only to its sender, not delivered, and a moderation event is created. A `blocked` message is not delivered. No release path is built; that is recorded as a decision needed before moderation is switched on.

### D9 — Effect of a block on an existing match and conversation
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 6
- The UI says the blocked person "won't be able to view your profile or contact you" and that it "can be undone from Settings".
- **Missing:** are existing likes, the match and the conversation deleted, hidden or frozen, and are they restored on unblock?
- **Fallback:** nothing is deleted. While a block exists in either direction, each person is hidden from the other in discovery, profile view, matches and conversations, and no interaction is accepted. Unblocking restores visibility.

### D10 — When a conversation is created
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 4 and 5
- The frontend has no "start conversation" call. **Handling:** created together with the Match, in the same transaction.

### D11 — Socket.IO event contract and presence
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 5
- MP §18 lists concepts only. No Socket.IO client exists in the frontend, so nothing constrains event names, payloads, acknowledgements, or when `recently_active` applies.
- **Handling:** a new event contract is proposed in `API_CONTRACT.md` before Recovery 5 code: token in the handshake, join and leave by conversation ID with a membership check, a new-message event, a read event. Typing indicators are not built, since the frontend does not need them. Presence is held in process memory; the `recently_active` window is a configuration value.

### D12 — Session device label and location
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- `DeviceSession` has `deviceLabel` ("Chrome on macOS") and `location` ("Mumbai, India"). No IP-geolocation provider is approved.
- **Handling:** `deviceLabel` from the User-Agent header. `location` is returned empty. No geolocation service is added.

### D13 — Creating the first admin
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 2 (blocks admin testing in Recovery 9)
- Roles are `USER` and `ADMIN` (MP §5). Nothing says how an account became an admin. The frontend has no separate admin login.
- **Fallback:** a command-line script, run on the server, promotes an already-registered phone number to admin. No HTTP route and no automatic promotion from an environment variable.

### D14 — How the admin verification queue is derived
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- `VerificationQueueItem` has a `verificationType` string and a status of "Ready for Approval", "Name Mismatch" or "Awaiting Documents". The last two need provider detail that does not exist while the provider is disabled.
- **Handling:** the queue lists accounts in `manual_review`, all shown as "Ready for Approval". `verificationType` is the configured provider's name or "Not available". The other two labels are never produced.

### D15 — Data export
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- The frontend has `requestDataExport()` returning `{ requested: true }` and tells the user a download link will arrive "by email". No email address exists. The recovery package does not mention data export at all.
- **Fallback:** the request is recorded with a timestamp and returns `{ requested: true }`. No archive is generated and nothing is sent. This is listed in the security audit as an unfulfilled user-facing promise.

### D16 — The deletion window
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- **Record says:** a request records requested time, scheduled purge time, status and purge metadata; the purge is idempotent (R01 §5). MP §24 asks for a "safe confirmation/re-authentication flow". The frontend's `requestDeletion()` sends no data.
- **Missing:** what confirms the request; whether the user can sign in during the 30 days; whether signing in or anything else cancels it.
- **Fallback:** an authenticated request is enough. From that moment the profile is hidden and all sessions are revoked. Signing in again does not cancel the request, and no cancel route is built.

### D17 — Pause and resume
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 9
- `pauseProfile()` returns `{ paused: true }`; the frontend has no resume call. R01 §5 says pause "must respect stored privacy settings".
- **Handling:** a separate `paused` flag in `UserSettings`. Discovery requires not paused *and* `visibleInDiscovery`. Resuming clears the flag and leaves the stored privacy values untouched. The pause route accepts an optional `{ paused: false }` to resume.

### D18 — Report payload
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 6
- The Report dialog collects no reason. MP §21 names the targets (user, profile, message) and the statuses.
- **Handling:** `targetType`, `targetId` and an optional free-text `reason`. No category list is invented. Reporting yourself is rejected. Reporting a message requires being a participant in its conversation (R01 §5).

### D19 — Derived card fields, and what "recommended" and "featured" return
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 4
- **Handling:** `sharedInterests` is the overlap of the two interest lists. `compatibilityPercent` is optional in the type and is omitted; no formula is invented. `datingIntentionLabel` and card `vibeTags` are labels looked up from the option lists. `getRecommended` runs the eligibility pipeline with no filters, most recently active first. `getFeatured` is the first recommended member, as in the mock. The "Nearby", "New on TORAZ" and "Popular" tabs do nothing in the frontend and get no backend behaviour.

### D20 — The WhatsApp channel
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- `requestOtp` accepts `channel: "sms" | "whatsapp"`; `resendOtp(requestId)` carries no channel; the frontend README says both buttons call the same function.
- **Handling:** the field is accepted and validated. Delivery is by SMS only.

### D21 — Verification transitions in each provider mode
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 7
- No provider has been chosen, so no real request, callback or signature format exists.
- **Handling:** `unavailable` returns 503 for start, liveness and retry; status still reads. `dev_simulation` reproduces the frontend mock's transitions. `real` is an adapter interface that fails closed until a provider is specified. A callback route is built only if you want the placeholder; it would reject everything until a provider's signature scheme is known.

### D22 — Premium catalog, recurring grants and Boost ordering
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 8
- Pack, boost and plan IDs with counts and durations live in FE:`services/premium/types.ts`, with prices marked as demo values.
- **Handling:** a server-side catalog mirrors those IDs, counts and durations so client amounts are never trusted. With payment disabled, purchase, Boost activation and subscribe all return the disabled response and change nothing. Weekly free Super Likes, monthly free Boosts, subscription expiry and any effect of Boost on discovery order are not built; each is recorded as needing a product decision.

### D23 — Technical choices the record leaves open
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** Recovery 1
- Module system (MP §1 allows either), validation library ("Zod or Joi"), test runner, dependency versions, Node version ("maintained LTS").
- **Handling:** see `IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` §2.

---

## E. Environment

### E1 — The npm registry is blocked
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 1
- **Observed:** every request to `registry.npmjs.org` returns 403 with `x-deny-reason: host_not_allowed` and the text "Add this host to your network egress settings to allow access."
- **Effect:** no `npm install`. Express, Mongoose, Socket.IO and every test library are unavailable. The application cannot be started here.
- **Fallback:** code is written, checked with `node --check`, and covered only by tests that need no packages. Everything else is reported as "not executed", as last time.

### E2 — No MongoDB
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 2
- **Observed:** no MongoDB binary; `fastdl.mongodb.org` refused by egress policy; Docker has no running daemon.
- **Effect:** no persistence, transaction, unique-index or concurrency test can run, and R01 §11 makes those part of the definition of done.
- **Fallback:** database-backed tests are written and delivered but marked "not executed" until they are run on a machine that has MongoDB.

### E3 — The linked computer could not be reached
**Class:** INFO
- Two attempts returned "not connected". Nothing on it was inspected. If surviving TORAZ material is there, it is not reflected in these documents.

### E4 — The workspace is temporary
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 1
- This cloud workspace is reclaimed after inactivity. That is the same failure that caused this recovery.
- **Fallback:** at the end of every batch the full `backend/` tree is sent to you as a ZIP. A Git repository would be stronger; one can be connected to this session if you name it.

---

## Status log

Entries are appended; the sections above are not rewritten.

### 2026-10-07 — after Recovery 0 approval and Recovery 1

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| C10 | Closed | `IMPLEMENTATION_DECISIONS.md` created (decision AD-02). |
| D23 | Closed | CommonJS approved (AD-01). Remaining technical choices are recorded as R1-01 to R1-17 in the ledger, awaiting review with Recovery 1. |
| E4 | Answered, partly met | Git primary, ZIP secondary (AD-07). No Git remote is available: no GitHub account is linked to the session. A local repository was created inside `backend/` and is included in the ZIP. |
| E1 | **Still open** | `registry.npmjs.org` still answers 403 `host_not_allowed`. `npm install` was attempted once in Recovery 1 and failed. HTTP tests and lint through `npm` were not executed. |
| E2 | **Still open** | MongoDB host still refused. No database test exists yet; the first ones arrive in Recovery 2. |
| E3 | Still open | The linked computer was not connected on two further attempts. |
| B1, B9 | Still open | The final search (AD-06) found no Postman collection, route inventory, backend ZIP or repository. |
| All other ASK gaps | Unchanged | Not needed by Recovery 1 (AD-03). |

### 2026-10-07 — after Recovery 1 approval and Recovery 2

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D13 | Closed | Approved reconstruction (AD-15): one-time command-line promotion. Designed in `API_CONTRACT.md` §4.1, implemented in Recovery 2. |
| C3, C4, C5, C6, D7, D20 | Applied | Built with the defaults recorded above; details in ledger entries R2-08 to R2-12. Awaiting review with Recovery 2. |
| D4 | Refined, still open | The registration marker is `User.registrationCompletedAt` (ledger R2-11), not a field on the profile. Draft storage itself is still Recovery 3. |
| D1 | Partly applied | The account ID is the identifier in authentication. Its use for members elsewhere is still Recovery 3 onward. |
| E1 | **Still open** | Registry still answers 403. No install. 38 HTTP tests and 10 validator tests not executed. |
| E2 | **Still open** | No MongoDB. 82 database tests written and not executed. |
| E3 | Still open | The linked computer was not tried again in this batch. |
| E4 | Partly met | Local Git repository and ZIP. Still no Git remote. |
| All other ASK gaps | Unchanged | B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, B8, C8, D9, D15, D16 were not needed by Recovery 2 (AD-16). |

New open questions raised by Recovery 2 are listed at the end of the Recovery 2 section of the ledger: second administrator, re-registration of a deleted number, the SMS provider's API, and an audit record for the first-administrator command.

### 2026-10-08 — after Recovery 2 approval and Recovery 3

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| C2 | Closed | 10 MB, as the named setting `MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB` (decision AD-18). Magic bytes, decoding, dimensions and re-encoding are all still enforced. |
| C8 | Closed | The more restrictive control wins (decision AD-19). Written in `API_CONTRACT.md` §7 before the code; enforced by `effectivePrivacy()` and `toPublicProfile()`. The Settings side applies from Recovery 9. |
| C9 | Applied | `photos`, `phoneVerified`, `countryCode` and `phoneNumber` are ignored on write and filled from the photo records and the account on read. |
| D1 | Applied | No profile or photo route takes an account or profile ID; `profileId` appears only in the registration response. |
| D4 | Closed by default, awaiting review | One profile per account; drafts and registration converge on it; `Profile.registeredAt` guards registration and `User.registrationCompletedAt` is the account state (ledger R3-09, R3-10). |
| D5 | Applied | All 22 choice fields are checked against the frontend's lists, generated by a script and pinned to the frontend file's SHA-256 (ledger R3-02). |
| D6 | Applied, one point still open | JPEG re-encoding, provisional dimension limits, an authenticated serving route with one visibility policy. Still open, on purpose: how a browser `<img>` fetches a photo (no bearer token; Helmet's `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin`). Frontend integration. |
| E1 | **Still open** | Registry still answers 403. 48 HTTP tests, 19 validator tests (as part of the suite) and lint through `npm` not executed. The validators were run ad hoc against Zod found on this machine, under both its Zod 3 and Zod 4.0 APIs. |
| E2 | **Still open** | No MongoDB. 136 database tests written and not executed. |
| E3, E4 | Unchanged | No linked computer was used. Local Git and ZIP; no remote. |
| All other ASK gaps | Unchanged | B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, B8, D9, D15, D16 were not needed by Recovery 3 (decision AD-21). |

### 2026-10-09 — Recovery 4 preflight (stopped before coding)

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| B7 | Principle proposed by you (mutual compatibility); **one rule open (Q2)** | Evidence: only `gender` and `interestedIn` take part; no age or other preference is stored. Open: whether `women`/`men` admit `non_binary`, `self_describe`, `prefer_not_to_say`. |
| B6 | Proposed `-1`; **awaiting approval (Q3)** | Conforms to `distanceKm: number`; the cards will render "-1 km away". Open: whether a distance filter includes unknown distances. |
| B2 | Principle proposed by you; **details awaiting approval (Q6)** | The frontend has no revoke or withdraw method; the backend routes for them would have no frontend caller. |
| B3 | **Unresolved** | The only number, 3, is the starting state of a frontend mock. R01 confirms a grant existed but not its amount or trigger. Nothing will be granted until you decide (Q1). |
| D24 | **New, awaiting decision (Q4)** | The Discover screen sends `onlineOnly: true` by default; presence does not exist until Recovery 5. |
| D25 | **New, awaiting decision (Q5)** | `MemberCard.age` is a required number; the approved Recovery 3 public view gives `null` when the exact age is hidden. |
| E1, E2 | **Still open** | npm registry and MongoDB still unreachable (checked 2026-10-09). |
| All other ASK gaps | Unchanged | Not needed by Recovery 4. |

Evidence and options for each: `docs/reports/RECOVERY_4_DECISION_REQUEST.md`.

### 2026-10-09 — Recovery 4 decisions approved

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| B3 | Closed (AD-22) | 3 Super Likes at registration completion, once, as a unique ledger event; 409 `no_super_likes`; no refund on withdrawal. A new decision, not a recovered rule. |
| B7 | Closed (AD-23) | Strict, mutual. `non_binary`, `self_describe` and `prefer_not_to_say` members are shown only to, and see only, members who chose `everyone`. |
| B6 | Closed (AD-24) | `-1`; unknown distances pass a distance filter; the cards render "-1 km away" until frontend integration. |
| B2 | Closed (AD-27) | The eight approved details. |
| D24 | Closed (AD-25) | `onlineOnly` ignored until Recovery 5, which must enable it. |
| D25 | Closed (AD-26) | `age: null` when hidden; frontend type mismatch left to integration. |
| D19 | Applied in Recovery 4 | Shared interests, labels, ordering as recorded; no compatibility percentage. |

### 2026-10-09 — after Recovery 4

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| B2, B3, B6, B7, D24, D25 | Applied | As decided in AD-22 to AD-27. Details in ledger entries R4-01 to R4-22. |
| D1 | Applied | Members are addressed by account ID (`:memberId`); the Match ID is internal. |
| D2 | Applied | Timestamps are ISO; no `*Label` field is produced in Recovery 4 (`lastActiveLabel` omitted). |
| D10 | Prepared | The Match ID is stable and internal; Recovery 5 attaches the conversation to it. |
| D19 | Applied | `sharedInterests` overlap, labels from option lists, no compatibility percentage, featured = first recommended. |
| P3 | Applied | `Block` model and read-only policy, in both directions, for discovery, actions, lists, cards and photos. Routes remain Recovery 6. |
| E1 | **Still open** | Registry unreachable (checked 2026-10-09). 53 HTTP and 24 validator tests not executed in the suite; the validators were run ad hoc under the Zod 3 and Zod 4.0 APIs. |
| E2 | **Still open** | No MongoDB. 184 database tests written and not executed, including the Recovery 4 store contract and flows. |
| New question | Open, flagged | Whether upgrading a like to a Super Like should cost one (ledger R4-07). |

### 2026-10-09 — Recovery 4 review and consistency correction

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| R4-07 question (Super Like upgrade cost) | Closed (AD-29) | An upgrade costs exactly one; never twice; a failed upgrade leaves no debit. |
| Match / Super Like / registration consistency | **Closed in code (AD-30)**; runtime-unverified | The seven crash-consistency defects found in the review are removed by transactions; the fault-injection tests assert no partial state at every write boundary on the in-memory stores. Not executed against MongoDB (E2). |
| MongoDB topology | **New deployment requirement (AD-31)** | MongoDB must be a replica set or sharded cluster; the server refuses to start otherwise. A single server runs as a one-member replica set (README, "MongoDB must be a replica set"). The check is unit-tested with fake `hello` replies; its database tests are written and not executed (E2). |
| E1 | **Still open** | Registry unreachable (rechecked 2026-10-09: `npm view` timed out). 53 HTTP and 24 validator tests not executed in the suite; the validators were run ad hoc under the Zod 3 and Zod 4.0 APIs. |
| E2 | **Still open** | No MongoDB binary or package. 191 database tests written and not executed, now including the transactional paths and the start-up check on a replica set and a standalone server. |

### 2026-10-09 — Recovery 5 pre-flight (stopped before coding)

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D11 | **Awaiting decision (Q1, Q5)** | Socket handshake and event contract: no surviving source; proposal in `docs/reports/RECOVERY_5_DECISION_REQUEST.md`. |
| D8 | **Awaiting decision (Q2)** | What the moderation adapter does in Recovery 5, with no provider contract and no `ModerationEvent` until Recovery 6. |
| D24 / AD-25 | **Awaiting decision (Q3)** | Presence before the Recovery 9 "Online Activity Indicator" setting exists. |
| New | **Awaiting decision (Q4)** | Read state: "read up to" or one message; whether `delivered` is tracked. |
| B5, B12, D2, D3, D10 | Defaults to be applied | As recorded; D10 refined: the Conversation gets its own random ID, because the Match ID must stay internal (R4-03). |
| New | Recorded | The chat header's "End-to-end encrypted" is not true of a server-stored, server-moderated design. Frontend integration item; the frontend is not changed. |
| E1, E2 | **Still open** | Rechecked 2026-10-09: `registry.npmjs.org` does not resolve; Socket.IO not installed or declared; no MongoDB, no Docker daemon. |

### 2026-10-09 — Recovery 5 decisions approved

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D11 | Closed (AD-32, AD-34, AD-36) | Handshake, presence and event contract decided; written in `API_CONTRACT.md` §11 before the handlers. |
| D8 | Recovery 5 part closed (AD-33) | Disabled adapter only; production refuses to start without moderation. Holding flagged messages and `ModerationEvent` stay with Recovery 6. |
| D10 | Closed (AD-36) | Conversation created in the Match transaction, with its own random ID. |
| B5 | Closed (AD-36) | Cursor pagination as recorded (ledger R5-04). |
| New (read state) | Closed (AD-35) | Read up to; delivery tracked separately. |
| D24 / AD-25 | Closed (AD-34) | Presence live; `onlineOnly` and `isOnline` switched on, honouring `showOnlineStatus` (AD-19). |
| New | **Open, for Recovery 9** | The "Online Activity Indicator" setting must feed effective privacy's `showOnlineStatus`, which presence already honours. |
| New | **Open, deployment** | Production cannot start until a moderation provider is integrated (AD-33). The provider's API contract is needed. |

### 2026-10-09 — after Recovery 5

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D3, D10, D11, B5, B12 | Applied | As decided in AD-32 to AD-36; details in ledger R5-01 to R5-29. |
| D8 | Recovery 5 part applied | Disabled adapter only; production refuses to start. Holding flagged messages and `ModerationEvent` remain Recovery 6. |
| D9 | Fallback applied to messaging | Blocks hide conversations and refuse every messaging operation both ways; nothing deleted. The decision itself is still Recovery 6's ASK. |
| D2 | Applied; **integration item** | `sentAt` and `lastMessageAt` are ISO; the frontend renders them verbatim. |
| New | **Integration items, recorded** | "End-to-end encrypted" banner is untrue of this design; `memberName` is a first name; the conversation list and history are paginated though the frontend methods take no paging arguments. |
| New | **Open, for Recovery 9** | "Online Activity Indicator" must feed `showOnlineStatus` (presence already honours it). Purge must tombstone messages in place. |
| New | **Open, deployment** | Production cannot start until a moderation provider is integrated (AD-33). Socket.IO is single-instance (AD-36). |
| E1, E2 | **Still open** | Registry unreachable (rechecked 2026-10-09); `socket.io`, `socket.io-client`, mongoose and MongoDB unavailable. 27 validator, 56 HTTP, 232 database and 4 Socket.IO tests written and not executed; validators run ad hoc under the Zod 3 and Zod 4.0 APIs. |

### 2026-10-12 — Recovery 5 review

New gaps from the review of R5-05, R5-07 and R5-29 (ledger, "Recovery 5 review").

### D26 — Default of Discover's "online members only"
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** frontend integration (any batch that changes the frontend)
- **Record says:** nothing. The frontend's `DiscoverScreen` starts with `onlineOnly = true` and sends it for every tab. No recovered requirement or decision states that Discover defaults to online members only.
- **Already decided:** the backend enforces `onlineOnly=true` when sent (AD-25, AD-34), and has no default of its own.
- **Question:** should the Discover screen keep sending `onlineOnly: true` by default (showing only members connected at that moment), or default to `false` and leave online-only to the "Online Now" tab and the checkbox?
- **Until decided:** backend unchanged; frontend unchanged.

### D27 — Conversation list paging in the frontend
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** frontend integration
- The backend paginates the conversation list (page 1–1000, limit 1–50, default 20; `API_CONTRACT.md` §10.2). `getConversations()` takes no arguments, so an integrated frontend would see 20 conversations, and its Unread and Waiting filters and total unread count would undercount beyond that.
- **Handling:** a separately approved frontend change passes `page`/`limit` and follows `hasMore`. The backend is not changed to return unbounded lists.

### D28 — Unambiguous "unchecked" moderation state
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** moderation provider integration and frontend integration
- Unchecked messages are sent as `moderation: "clear"` + `moderationChecked: false`, because the frontend type allows only `clear`, `pending_review` and `blocked` (`API_CONTRACT.md` §10.3).
- **Handling at that time:** add an explicit unchecked value to the frontend type, or have the frontend read `moderationChecked`. Messages stored as `unmoderated` are never re-labelled as checked.

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D26 | **Open: needs your decision** | Backend correct either way. |
| D27 | Recorded | Frontend integration item. |
| D28 | Recorded | Future migration; production already cannot run unchecked (AD-33). |
| E1, E2 | **Still open** | Rechecked 2026-10-12 (see the review report). Procedure for an equipped environment: `docs/RUNTIME_VERIFICATION.md`. |

### 2026-10-12 — D26 decided

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D26 | **Closed (AD-37)** | Discover is to default to `onlineOnly: false`. **Pending frontend integration item:** change `DiscoverScreen.tsx`'s initial `onlineOnly` state from `true` to `false`, in a separately approved frontend change; the "Online Now" tab keeps forcing `true`. Not done; the frontend is unchanged. Backend unchanged and already correct for both values. |

### 2026-10-12 — Recovery 6 pre-flight (stopped before coding)

Decision request: `docs/reports/RECOVERY_6_DECISION_REQUEST.md`.

### D29 — No frontend wiring for block and report
**Class:** DEFAULT · **Needed by:** frontend integration
- FE `PublicProfileScreen.tsx` has "Report Profile" and "Block" dialogs that only show a toast; `services/` has no block or report method. The Block dialog says it "can be undone from Settings", but Settings shows only `blockedCount` and `reportedCount`, with no blocked list or unblock control. The Messages screen has no report or block action.
- **Handling:** the backend provides block, unblock, blocked list and report routes (Recovery 6). Wiring them, and adding a blocked list with unblock to Settings, is a separately approved frontend change. The frontend is not changed.

### D30 — Retention of report evidence and moderation events
**Class:** ASK · **Needed by:** Recovery 9 (purge), informed by Recovery 6 Q4/Q5
- If a reported message's text is snapshotted into the report (Recovery 6 Q4, option B), or moderation events are kept, the Recovery 9 purge needs a rule for them. R01 tombstones messages at purge; MP §24 says not to invent a retention policy silently.
- **Handling:** recorded as an addition to B8; decided before Recovery 9.

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D9 | **Awaiting decision (Q1)** | Recommended: hide and freeze, restore on unblock (the fallback already in force). |
| B4 | **Awaiting decision (Q2)** | Historical number lost; recommended provisional 10 per 24 h, named setting. |
| D18 | **Awaiting confirmation (Q3)** | Default plus details: account-ID targets, recipient-only message reports, reporting allowed after a block, one open report per target. |
| D8 | **Recovery 6 part awaiting decision (Q5)** | `ModerationEvent` and the held-message path; AD-33 unchanged. |
| New | **Awaiting decision (Q4, Q6, Q7, Q8)** | Report evidence; meaning of "admin report management hooks"; blocked-list fields; closing the block races. |
| D29 | Recorded | Frontend integration item. |
| D30 | Recorded | For Recovery 9. |
| E1, E2 | **Still open** | Rechecked 2026-10-12: registry does not resolve; no MongoDB; no Docker daemon. |

### 2026-10-12 — Recovery 6 decisions approved

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D9 | **Closed (AD-38)** | Hide and freeze both ways; nothing deleted; no refund; no notification; restored on unblock. |
| B4 | **Closed provisionally (AD-39)** | 10 reports per account per 24 hours, `REPORT_RATE_LIMIT_*`; provisional, not the recovered figure. |
| D18 | **Closed (AD-40)** | Report rules as approved; database-enforced one open report per target. |
| D8 | **Recovery 6 part closed (AD-42)** | Held messages plus `ModerationEvent` in one transaction; no release flow; AD-33 unchanged. |
| D30 | **Still open, for Recovery 9** | Retention of report evidence (AD-41) and moderation events: no duration invented. |
| D29 | Still open | Frontend wiring of block and report, and a Settings blocked list with unblock. |
| New: Q9 | **Awaiting decision** | The synchronization at the commit-to-emission boundary (AD-45): `DATABASE_DESIGN.md` §7.6, `docs/reports/RECOVERY_6_Q9_DECISION_REQUEST.md`. No Recovery 6 code until decided. |

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Q9 | **Closed (AD-46)** | S1, the in-process pair gate. **New hard deployment restriction:** one Node.js process (README, `API_CONTRACT.md` §11.8). |

### 2026-10-22 — post-9B decisions (AD-84 to AD-96)

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D12 | **Closed (AD-88)** | `deviceLabel` from the stored User-Agent (fixed list of names), `location` always empty, no geolocation. Implemented: `GET /api/settings/sessions`, `DELETE /api/settings/sessions/:sessionId` (`API_CONTRACT.md` §16.5). Runtime-unverified |
| D17 | **Closed (AD-89)** | `UserSettings.paused`; discovery needs `visibleInDiscovery` and not paused; unset = not paused (no migration); `POST /api/settings/pause`, resume with `{ "paused": false }` (§16.6). Runtime-unverified |
| C8 (settings side) | **Partly decided** | `displayExactAge` approved and implemented (AD-93); `approximateProximity` (AD-94) and `culturalHeritageAndHometown` (AD-96) not approved, refused; `intentAndDietaryPrivacy` deferred (AD-95), refused |
| D15, D16, B8, D30 | Still open | Export, deletion window, purge scope and retention: data-lifecycle decisions L-01 to L-17 and L-20, P-12, P-13 (`docs/reports/RECOVERY_9B_DECISION_REGISTER.md`) |

### 2026-10-23 — deletion-request decisions (AD-97 to AD-102)

| Gap | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| D16 | **Request part closed (AD-97 to AD-99)** | Confirmation: a purpose-bound code to the account's own number. The window: 30 days is a waiting period before purge eligibility. During the window: sign-in is possible, signing in never cancels, explicit verified cancellation, restricted mode. Implemented, non-destructive (`API_CONTRACT.md` §17); runtime-unverified |
| C3 | Applied as before | `deletionPendingAt` is a separate field; `accountStatus` keeps `active` / `suspended` / `deleted` unchanged |
| B8, D30, D15 | Still open | Purge scope, retention, export: L-04 to L-11, L-14 to L-17, L-20, P-12, P-13 |
| New: frontend copy | Deferred | "purged **within** 30 days" contradicts AD-98's waiting period; frontend off-limits |
